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Abstract 
In the early 1990s Greece accepted a large number of immigrants from a variety of contexts. Since then 
'organised criminality' has become an important aspect of the immigration nexus in the country, and 
ethnicity has been viewed as an extremely important - if not the primary - explanatory variable. 
Simultaneously, there has been very little empirical research on 'organised crime' in Greece in general 
and 'organised crime' and ethnicity in particular. The purpose of this article, which is based on previous 
research that the author has conducted on three illegal markets in Greece (a. migrant smuggling 
business, b. the cigarette black market, and c. the market of stolen cars and car parts), is to show the 
extent to which these illegal markets are controlled by foreign nationals, and establish whether there is 
such thing as an 'alien conspiracy' in the particular country. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 The relationship between ethnicity, migration, and „organized crime‟ has been 
one of the most widely researched issues in criminology. In fact ethnicity, migration, 
and „organized crime‟ are terms that evolved together especially in the American 
context, which was unwilling to accept that “…modes of criminality, which are 
perceived as especially menacing” (Hobbs, 1997: 824-825) can be a native feature. 
Some authors have argued that ethnicity and migration, through to the exclusion, 
marginalization, and blocking of legitimate opportunities, are characteristics that 
facilitate „organized crime‟. Bell (1953), for example, saw „organized crime‟ as the 
ultimate attempt by the migrants in the United States to move towards the upper 
echelons of the American society, and pursue their American Dream (see also Mahan, 
1998). Some others talked about an „alien conspiracy‟ undermining the American way 
of life and market, a very popular perspective especially after World War II. Thus, 
although the concept of „organized crime‟ initially had no ethnic connotation (von 
Lampe, 2001a), the notions of ethnicity and migration have been at the core, and in 
the media and public perception the phenomenon is represented at its best by the 
„Mafia‟ (see Block, 1994), Jewish, Irish and other migrant „organized crime‟ groups, 
which were thought to be overrunning the illegal markets in the United States. In 
Europe, although the debate on „organized crime‟ and illegal markets was not 
continuously preoccupied with ethnicity (see, for example, von Lampe, 2001a; Hobbs, 
2004), similar research on the involvement of ethnic minorities and foreigners in 
„organized crime‟ has been conducted. Although there are a number of authors, who 
reject the ethnic model as an important explanatory element, as Bovenkerk et al. 
(2003: 25) suggest, the image of the ethnically distinct „organized crime‟ group is 
“…adhered to not only by the public but also by most criminologists…”. „Organized 
crime‟ has been largely viewed as an „alien conspiracy‟ (Potter, 1994), and this has 
constituted one of the most influential perspectives on „organised crime‟ discourse, 
one that has greatly influenced how „organised crime‟ has been viewed as well as the 
design of public policy against „organised crime‟.  
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 In the early 1990s Greece accepted a large number of foreigners as 
immigrants from a variety of contexts. It is extremely difficult to provide accurate 
figures regarding the number of foreigners as there are an unknown number of 
undocumented foreigners in the country. However, we could provide the numbers of 
documented foreigners. According to the last Greek Census in 2001 the total of 
documented foreigners in Greece was 797,091 (ESYE, 2001)
1
 in a population of 
10,964,020. The largest foreign group by far are the Albanians and are followed by 
Bulgarians, Georgians, Romanians, Russians, and Ukrainians.  
 Since the very beginning of the 1990s „organised criminality‟ has become an 
important aspect of the immigration nexus in Greece, and ethnicity has been viewed 
as an extremely important - if not the primary - explanatory variable. As Xenakis 
(2006) has argued, it was in the 1990s that „organised crime‟ was defined and 
understood as a problem in the Greek context. The „organised‟ criminality of non-
Greeks in Greece has been a political and academic „hot potato‟. It is a fact that 
connecting minorities and migrants (terms that already have an emotional appeal, see 
van Amersfoort, 1978), with crime and „organized crime‟ has been a practice that led 
to a “number of theoretical and political miscalculations and misconceptions” 
(Bovenkerk, 2001: 110), and fuelled the „crime-prone foreigner‟ stereotype. 
However, avoiding or turning a blind eye to the topic of the relationship between 
ethnicity and „organised crime‟ in Greece altogether would be at the expense of both 
Greeks and foreigners. This is because at the moment the stereotype of the 
„organised‟, foreign criminal is very well consolidated in the Greek social 
consciousness, ethnicity remains at the core of public discourse on „organized crime‟ 
in the country, and clear answers about the link between foreigners and „organised 
crime‟ are needed .  
 Simultaneously, there has been very little research on „organised crime‟ in 
Greece in general, and „organised crime‟ and ethnicity in particular. The purpose of 
this article, which is based on previously published or publicised research that the 
author has conducted on three illegal markets in Greece (migrant smuggling business, 
Antonopoulos and Winterdyk, 2006; the cigarette black market, Antonopoulos, 2008; 
and the market of stolen cars and car parts, Antonopoulos, 2007), is to show the 
extent to which these illegal markets are „controlled‟ or „owned‟ by foreign nationals, 
and establish whether there is such thing as an „alien conspiracy‟ in the particular 
country. This endeavour is based on the assumption that the aforementioned illegal 
markets are part of the body of knowledge widely defined as „organised crime‟ (see 
von Lampe‟s, 2001b analysis on the study of the cigarette black market as a 
contribution to the study on „organised crime‟).2 The following table indicates the 
sources of information and data used during the author‟s empirical research on the 
three illegal markets (Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 This is the number of foreigners as opposed to immigrants from specific countries that are subjected 
to criminalising processes (e.g. non EU Europeans such as Albanians). The term foreigners includes 
individuals who are immigrants and non-immigrant foreigners who, for instance, come from European 
Union member states.  
2 Despite the fact that what is perceived as „organised crime‟ does not only involve illegal markets (see, 
for instance, von Lampe, 2008). 
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Table 1. Sources of information and data, by illegal market.
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Illegal market Sources of information and data 
 
 
Migrant smuggling 
business  
 
(Antonopoulos & 
Winterdyk, 2006) 
- Interviews with Hellenic police officers in 2002; 
- Unpublished statistics on individuals arrested for migrant smuggling 
obtained from the Hellenic Police in 2003. These statistics refer to the 
first eight months of 2000 and 2001;  
- Interviews with Albanian and Kurdish migrants living in southwest 
Greece (2002 and 2004); 
- Interviews with two Kurdish individuals, who were actively involved 
in the smuggling of migrants.   
 
 
 
Cigarette black market 
 
(Antonopoulos, 2008) 
- Official statistics from the Hellenic Coast Guard and the Customs 
Authority;  
- Interviews with cigarette smugglers (three Kurdish retired cigarette 
smugglers, a Greek retired procurer, a Greek retired bootlegger and two 
„runners‟); 
- Pre-trial reports from the Hellenic Coast Guard and the Hellenic 
Police;   
- Annual reports on „organised crime‟ for the years 2004 and 2005 
published by the Hellenic Ministry of Public Order (MPO); 
- Articles from high-circulation newspapers, financial and business 
newspapers, locally circulated newspapers and press releases from the 
Ministry of Mercantile Marine and the Bureau for Special Inspections 
(Ypiresia Eidikon Eleghon – YP.E.E.); 
- Interviews with customers of the cigarette black market. 
 
 
 
Market of stolen cars and 
car parts 
 
(Antonopoulos, 2007) 
-Statistics from the Hellenic Ministry of Public Order (MPO); 
- Articles from high-circulation national and local newspapers; 
- Pre-trial reports from the Hellenic police; 
 - Interviews with Hellenic police in 2002 & 2007; 
- Informal conversations with employees & entrepreneurs in the legal 
car business; 
- Interview with engineer from the Directorate of Transportation; 
- Interview with used car dealer selling stolen cars; 
- Interviews with 2 professional car thieves. 
 
In the following sections there will be a focus on: (a) the representation of „organised 
crime‟ as an imported feature and the representation of the foreign „organised 
criminal‟ in Greece and (b) the case studies of the three illegal markets researched. 
This article will finish with a discussion and a concluding section.  
 
 
‘Alien Conspiracy’: The ‘Other’ vs. Greece 
According to Potter (1994), who has summarised the work of previous researchers 
and theorists such as Cressey (1969) and Schelling (1971), the basic tenets or 
propositions of the Alien Conspiracy Theory are: 
 „Organised crime‟ is a foreign thing. Something that is imported from abroad 
and is often associated with established ethnic minorities or recent 
unassimilated and often assimilated migrant groups (Task Force on Organized 
Crime, 1967). 
 „Organised crime‟ is the business of powerful, rigid, hierarchical, Mafia 
„organisations‟ similar or identical to those in cinematographic accounts (e.g. 
The Godfather) that resemble legal businesses, corporations or even law 
enforcement agencies (see Cressey, 1969).  
                                                        
3 For the analytic methodologies please refer to original sources as indicated in the table. 
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 „Organised crime‟ groups have the objective of monopolising an illegal market 
and expanding it even to an international level.  
 „Organised crime‟ groups engage in a „campaign‟ to corrupt public officials, 
who are seen as essential for the smooth running of the business (Schelling, 
1971). 
 „Organised crime‟ groups engage in a campaign to corrupt the fiscal structures. 
 Ethnicity is a key variable by which individuals are selected in / recruited by 
„organised crime organisations‟ (Cressey, 1969; Potter, 1994). 
Although these tenets have been -directly or indirectly- critiqued by a number of 
theorists and researchers (e.g. Smith, 1975; Block & Chambliss, 1981; Hobbs, 1988; 
Passas & Nelken, 1993; van Duyne, 1993; Woodiwiss, 2001; Naylor, 2004), they 
continue being quite powerful in official and media discourse. The aforementioned 
tenets have been integral to the perception of „organised crime‟ in Greece in the 
1990s, a perception that is extremely persistent even today. In the beginning of the 
1990s Greece introduced an immigration law, Law 1975 of 1991, the mentality of 
which as well the initial link between foreigners and „organised crime‟, becomes clear 
in its introductory text where it is stated that foreigners create enormous social 
problems, and try to resolve their problems by being involved in criminal activities 
such as –among other – drug trafficking (Karydis, 1996).  
Clearly, in the beginning of 1990s the discussions on migration policies were 
in essence identified with discussions on „organised‟ crime, conventional criminality, 
and crime control. It was then that for the first time „organised crime‟ started to be 
perceived as a major issue for the Greek context despite the fact that what could be 
labelled as „organised criminal activities‟ have existed in the country for centuries 
(see, for instance, Gardikas, 1958; Lambropoulou, 2003). The Greek media created a 
climate of threat and „ontological (in)security‟, as Giddens (1991) would argue, and 
became the very root of a „moral panic‟ based on the social awareness of „organised 
crime‟ (see Fishman, 1978), which in turn was based on the stereotype of the „Other‟ 
(see Konstantinidou, 1999). Great emphasis was given to some forms of „organised 
criminality‟, which were considered unknown to the Greek context. Until the point of 
foreigners‟ entrance in Greece „organised crime‟ was a synonym of the Italian Mafia 
and La Cosa Nostra, and the Colombian cocaine trafficking Cartels all of which, 
however, were viewed either as cinematographically interesting to the Greek public or 
distant from the Greek reality. Indeed „organised crime‟ was seen as a very un-Greek 
thing, the importation of which coincided with the entrance of foreigners in the 
country in the beginning of the 1990s. However, these sensational terms such as the 
Mafia and the Cartel have been unquestionably used by the media as if they have been 
objectively representing the situation with „organised crime‟ and illegal markets in the 
country.  
 The stereotype of the foreign „organised criminal‟ was further reinforced by a 
number of high profile incidents in the late 1990s. These incidents were viewed 
through the prism of „organised crime‟, even though evidence of a link between the 
individuals „starring‟ in the incidents and „organised crime‟ was absent. For example, 
the case of Flamur Pisli, a young Albanian, who being armed with an AK-47 and two 
hand grenades, held the passengers and the driver of a bus as hostages in May 1999. 
One of Pisli‟s requests, namely to be given passage to Albania, was granted. The 
Greek media were talking about “a reception that Albanian mafia was organising for 
Pisli” and about “some members of the Albanian mafia cheering for the hostage-
taker‟s success” (see Hatsios and Kantouris, 1999). However, Pisli was a socially 
isolated offender and no „Albanian mafia‟ link was ever established.  
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 It is plausible to argue that these representations must have had an effect on 
how the Greek public views the issue of criminality of migrants including „organised 
criminality‟. Antonopoulos (2006a) in his study on public perceptions of migrant 
criminality and tendency of reporting migrant criminality found that the Greek public 
are adamant that migrants have altered the nature of crime in the country by 
„importing‟ a number of criminal activities that were unknown to the Greek context 
before early 1990s such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, women and children 
trafficking, and migrant smuggling among other.  
Similar views are held by law enforcement agencies. In 1998 the Anti-
Organised Crime Squad (Soma Dioksis Organomenou Eglimatos) was established in 
Athens. The squad‟s main concern was Russian „organised crime‟. Greek law 
enforcement agencies have also produced data compiled in official reports that signify 
the importance of ethnicity as a description and analysis variable when it comes to 
„organised crime‟ in Greece. This is reflected in the Annual Organised Crime Reports 
(AOCR), which have been based on data and information provided by law 
enforcement agencies and have been published by the Greek Ministry of Public Order 
(MPO)
4
. Lambropoulou (2003) expresses reservations over the definition of 
„organised criminal activities‟ by the MPO as well as its evaluation. We share similar 
reservations; however, in the current article we are interested in „organised crime‟ 
representations too, which AOCR are an integral part of. The AOCR make explicit 
reference to the threat posed by non-indigenous „organised crime groups‟. 
Specifically, the 1999 AOCR suggests that “the ethnic crime groups that constituted a 
specific threat… in 1999 were the Albanians, Russians, Bulgarians, Romanians, 
Turkish, Iraqi, and in some cases Pakistani and groups of Bangladeshi nationals…” 
(MPO, 2000: 2). The AOCR also make reference to the ethnicity of „criminal 
organisations‟5 and specifically the „vast majority‟ of their „members‟. According to 
the AOCR of 2004 and 2005 (MPO, 2005; 2006) out of 317 „criminal organisations‟, 
110 (34.7%) comprised of foreign nationals only, 110 (34.7%) comprised of Greek 
nationals only, and a further 78 (24.6%) comprised of Greek and foreign nationals 
although - similarly to „organised‟ crime reports in other contexts (e.g. Germany, see 
von Lampe, 2004) - the degree and nature of collaboration among Greek and foreign 
nationals is unclear. The ethnic identity of the remaining 19 „criminal organisations‟ 
could not be established. The AOCR also make reference to specific ethnic groups and 
their involvement in specific „organised criminal activities‟. For example, the AOCR 
for 2004 (MPO, 2005) refers to „Albanian criminal organisations‟ involved in drug 
trafficking, robberies and thefts, Turkish, Iraqi, Chinese and Pakistani „criminal 
organisations‟ involved in migrant smuggling, Bulgarian „criminal organisations‟ 
involved in counterfeiting and fraud, Romanian „criminal organisations‟ involved in 
human trafficking, and Russian and Ukrainian „criminal organisations‟ involved in 
cigarette smuggling. The 2004 AOCR also offers a more threatening aspect of these 
„criminal organisations‟ by suggesting that the above „organisations‟‟ 
“activities…remain stable over time and appear not to be affected by external or 
internal factors…” (MPO, 2005: 6).  
The Greek economy is also portrayed as in danger due to the foreign illegal 
marketers. In an article appearing in the Greek daily Ethnos, for instance, it is 
                                                        
4 In 2007 the Ministry of Public Order was merged with the Ministry for the Interior. 
5 According to Law 2928 on „Organised Crime‟, which was introduced in 2001 and was heavily 
influenced by international efforts to „combat organised crime‟ such as the UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime, a „criminal organisation‟ is a structured and with continuous action 
group comprising of three or more members.   
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estimated that the illegal trade of several commodities by 50,000 migrants results in € 
2 billion in taxes being evaded (Kolonas, 2008). In the same article the Chair of the 
Commerce Association of Piraeus argued that “...the illegals have been operating 
uninterrupted for many years now, without paying taxes, making a profit at the 
expense of consumers, healthy commerce, the local community, Greek economy and 
employment. They put small and medium businesses in serious danger, [and] weaken 
the legal, healthy commerce...” (in Kolonas, 2008: 34). In a similar vein, the Chair of 
the Commercial and Industrial Chamber of Athens, noted that these illegal trade 
activities involve “...imported smuggled goods” and what he suggested towards the 
„eradication‟ of the illegal trade was –among other – tighter control of the borders (in 
Kolonas, 2008: 35).  
Thus, it appears that Greece is permeated by perceptions about the „organised 
criminal Other‟, who conspires against the Greek state and society, endangers the 
values of the country, transforms the quality of criminality in the country, and 
negatively influences the stability of the financial system. Needless to say, despite the 
certainly with which the whole issue of „organised crime‟ was treated by politicians, 
media, the public and law enforcement agencies there has been no clear view as to 
what „organised crime‟ really is. It has been largely perceived as a group of three or 
more people involved in the smuggling of several commodities, using violence and 
corrupting individuals towards amassing huge amounts of money, which is laundered 
in various ways. Overall, the issue of „organised crime‟ and the involvement of 
foreigners in „organised crime‟ have been perceived through the prism of threat 
similarly to other contexts (see, for instance, van Duyne, 2003a). Trigazis (2002), a 
high rank police officer, argued in his report on the organisation of the Greek police 
against „organised crime‟ that the phenomenon of „organised crime‟ features high on 
the list of new dangers after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of Cold War, 
and that „organised crime‟ threatens to corrode political institutions and disorganise 
economic order and societal cohesion. Simultaneously, however, the lack of adequate, 
sound, empirical data on „organised crime‟, has provided for an obstacle to a reliable 
and quality assessment of „organised crime‟ in the country (see Xenakis, 2006).  
 I will now turn to the social organisation of three illegal markets in Greece, 
namely the migrant smuggling business (Antonopoulos and Winterdyk, 2006), the 
cigarette black market (Antonopoulos, 2008) and the market of stolen cars and car 
parts (Antonopoulos, 2007) all of which are based on the available evidence, in order 
to examine whether the „Alien Conspiracy‟ tenets/propositions suggested directly or 
indirectly by politicians, the media, the public, and law enforcement agencies in 
Greece are present in these markets. 
 
 
Case Study 1 – Migrant Smuggling Business 
According to unpublished statistics obtained from the Greek police, the majority 
of the arrested migrant smugglers in Greece are Greeks. Specifically, they constituted 
58.4% of the arrestees in the first eight months of 2000, and 53.2% in the first eight 
months of 2001. Albanian nationals are also heavily involved in smuggling of 
migrants primarily from Albania. In particular they accounted for 16.1% in the first 
eight months of 2000, and 25.2% of the arrestees in the first eight months of 2001. 
The third nationality in terms of arrested migrant smugglers is the Turks since they 
accounted for 7.4% and 6.9% of the total arrested human smugglers in the first eight 
months of 2000 and 2001, respectively. The Bulgarians, Iraqi, Romanians, and 
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Russians are also involved, and the rest of the nationalities constitute a small number 
of cases of involvement into migrant smuggling (see table 2). 
 
Table 2. Arrested migrant smugglers in Greece from January to August 2000 & 
January to August 2001, by country of origin. 
 
Country of origin 
January – August 
2000 
January-August 
2001 
Albania 116 220 
Armenia 5 5 
Bangladesh 0 5 
Belgium 0 3 
Bulgaria 26 33 
Czech Republic 2 1 
Egypt 0 2 
F.Y.R.O. Macedonia 7 5 
Germany 1 2 
Georgia 3 13 
Greece 420 463 
Netherlands 4 1 
India 3 0 
Iraq  21 21 
Iran 2 4 
Israel 1 0 
Italy 1 0 
Kazakhstan 1 0 
Lebanon 5 0 
Lithuania 1 0 
Morocco 1 0 
Moldova 1 0 
Pakistan 4 4 
Poland 1 0 
Romania  14 9 
Russia 12 3 
Slovenia 0 1 
Sudan  0 1 
Sweden 0 2 
Syria 4 7 
Turkey 53 60 
UK 2 0 
Ukraine 8 4 
Serbia & Montenegro 0 1 
   
Total 719 870 
Source: unpublished data obtained from the Greek police in summer 2003 
 
Due to their significant limitations, the aforementioned statistics should be treated 
cautiously. These official statistics omit accounting for a large number of persons 
operating in countries other than Greece, something that completely distorts the image 
we have for the migrant smuggling networks. Kurdish migrants in Greece as well as 
the Kurdish migrant smugglers interviewed, for instance, suggested that in the groups 
they were participating there were Pakistani, Syrian and Turkish (as well as Greek) 
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smugglers involved in a well-coordinated effort. Thus, the fact that most of the 
individuals arrested for smuggling of migrants in Greece are Greek nationals, may in 
fact be the result of availability/accessibility of these individuals to the Greek 
authorities.  
There is a „division of duties‟ in migrant smuggling. These include: „leader’ 
(primarily for the Albanian groups), the recruiters, the transporters/guides, and the 
scouters, who have the responsibility to provide specific information about the checks 
of the police, the borderguards, and the army. The scouters, according to the police 
and the interviewed smugglers, are either Greeks, and specifically people with 
knowledge of the localities or documented and undocumented migrants, who have 
lived in Greece for a lengthy period, so as to enable them to know the localities and 
feel comfortable when moving around. Legal entrepreneurs, that is owners of legal 
businesses or workers in legal businesses, are also involved in the smuggling 
business. These are primarily hotel/house/apartment owners, who provide 
accommodation to migrants while they wait to be smuggled to either another location 
within a country or to another country. Legal entrepreneurs may also involve taxi 
drivers. The majority of the legal entrepreneurs involved in the migrant smuggling 
business are Greeks. We only came across only a couple of cases in which a foreign 
worker in a legal business facilitated the smuggling of migrants. 
The recruitment phase is an important part of the smuggling process. It could be 
safely argued that rather than the recruiter approaching „clients‟ most of the times it is 
the other way around; the client approaches the smuggler either him/herself or 
through his/her social network in the source country. In the transit countries, the 
recruitment of migrants to be smuggled involves both the migrants approaching the 
smuggler(s) and the smuggler(s) approaching migrants in areas where migrants gather 
(e.g. port areas). Prospective smuggled migrants, whether in the source or a transit 
country, are instructed as to the place they should gather and are given a specific date 
and time of departure. A large part (at least half) or whole of the payment is usually 
received by the smuggler before the journey something which does not guarantee that 
the „client‟ will reach his/her destination or, if so, alive and safe. Prospective 
smuggled individuals sell property or borrow money from relatives and friends in the 
country of origin, transit or destination countries in order to find cash for the journey. 
If cash is not available then property is handed over to the smuggler. There is no 
standard price for smuggling someone into or out of Greece. This largely depends on 
the distance, the means of transportation, the difficulties faced by the smugglers, the 
time of the year and the weather phenomena, and the presence of the army, the coast 
guard and/or the border police, and generally the complexities of the journey or the 
nationality of the smuggled individuals. For instance, Kurdish migrants pay less than 
migrants of other nationalities such as Indians.  
 In many instances violence is part of the migrants smuggling process. 
Smuggling groups, particularly the Albanian ones, have individuals, who are 
responsible for safeguarding the smuggling business through the use of violence or 
the threat of use of violence. However, violence is not an indispensible feature of the 
smuggling business. Moreover, corruption seems to be an integral part of the 
smuggling process when the smuggling involves crossing many transit countries or 
involves a large number of individuals. There is evidence of corrupt public officials 
not only facilitating the smuggling process or being bribed by primarily Greek 
smugglers simply to turn a blind eye but also being actively involved in the process. 
The corrupt public officials in Greece are exclusively Greek nationals since foreign 
nationals are barred from becoming public servants.  
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Case Study 2 – Cigarette Black Market 
 In 2004 there were 415 cases of cigarette smuggling known to the authorities, 
and 310,961,785 cigarettes were seized, which amounted for € 31,736,151.34 in 
evaded taxes. In 2005 there were 338 known cases of cigarette smuggling, and 
258,444,000 cigarettes were seized, which amounted for € 23,895,039.35 in evaded 
taxes (Customs Authority, 2006). The figures presented above do not provide a 
picture of the actual cigarette smuggling in the country, but only those cases that the 
Greek authorities come across. There is certainly a dark figure of cigarette smuggling 
in the country, and despite the fact that the European Confederation of Cigarette 
Retailers (cited in von Lampe, 2005: 12) argues that the illicit market share in Greece 
in the mid-1990s was 8%, it is impossible, given the quantity and the quality of the 
current statistical data and the lack of sophisticated efforts, to validate or disprove 
such a claim. 
 There seems to be a range of „entities‟ involved in cigarette smuggling that can be 
placed on a continuum. The smuggling of cigarettes can be conducted by individuals 
or by networks that capitalise on price differentials or need for social enhancement. 
There is also a number of „actors‟ in the cigarette smuggling business in Greece. The 
presentation of the division of labour/„actors‟ does not necessarily mean that these 
appear in every smuggling network. These „actors‟ are: the Wholesaler, who buys and 
assembles quantities of the merchandise, and distributes them in smaller parts to the 
„pushers‟. The wholesalers are Greeks and there is evidence of some foreign 
nationals. For instance in Antonopoulos‟ (2008) research a Russian and a Polish 
wholesaler were identified. There are also the Procurers, who are primarily Greek 
businessmen, and who buy large quantities of cigarettes from Greek tobacco 
companies with the intention to export them to Balkan countries. Middle-level 
smugglers include the Pushers, individuals who introduce the smuggled cigarettes 
into the street-level market. We came across pushers from the republics of the former 
Soviet Union, Kurdistan, and Greece. The Street-sellers are primarily drawn from the 
migrant community of the country and specifically from the community of migrants 
(including migrant ethnic Greeks) from the former Soviet and Kurdistan, and there is 
a small number of Albanian, Romanian, and Bulgarian migrants. There is also a small 
number of Greek Roma involved in the street selling of contraband cigarettes. The 
Scouters/Look-Outs warn street-sellers about the presence of the police in the area, 
and specifically known to them non-uniformed officers who exert money from street-
sellers, and the Warehouse Guards are responsible for „guarding‟ the storing places. 
Scouters/Look-Outs and Warehouse Guards are members of the migrant community 
in the country with very few exceptions. Legitimate shop and kiosk owners are 
Greeks, who own a shop or a kiosk in or around the street-selling area and „operate‟ 
as a quick „refuelling‟ point for street sellers, a place of quickly „hiding‟ the smuggled 
cigarettes or a distribution point for contraband (as well as legal) cigarettes. An 
interesting set of actors in the business are the Thieves/Burglars/Robbers, 
„professionals‟ who steal from warehouses of cigarettes destined for the legal market 
or from kiosks and other retail outlets. They are not an integral part of the cigarette 
smuggling network and they do not continuously feed the market with merchandise. 
We have come across thieves/burglars/robbers from countries of the former Soviet 
Union, Albania and Greece. The transportation of the merchandise is the 
responsibility of the Drivers/Captains. The majority of truck drivers are Greeks, and 
there are a number of Bulgarian, FYROM, Italian, Romanian, Turkish, Polish and 
Irish drivers. Captains, according to the available evidence, tend to be Greeks, 
Russians, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians. A node of the cigarette smuggling networks are 
 10 
the ‘Protectors’, who engage in the protection of the interests of cigarette smuggling 
business from extortion gangs, primarily of Albanian and Russian origin. They are 
also not an integral part of the smuggling and distribution of contraband cigarettes 
business. In the current research we came across „protectors‟ from the former Soviet 
Union. In addition, there are a number of Greek „protectors‟ also selling protection to 
establishments of the nocturnal economy. Finally, there are the corrupt public 
officials, who they are either actively involved in the cigarette smuggling business or 
turn a blind eye to the business. Corrupt public officials associated with the cigarette 
smuggling business in Greece include primarily police officers, customs officers, and 
coast guards. All corrupt public officials are Greek.     
There are big differences between the socio-economic characteristics of these 
actors in the three separate levels of cigarette smuggling (upper, middle and street-
level, see von Lampe, 2001b). Upper level smugglers include a wide range of 
individuals who lead respectable lives, and have a quite diverse employment and 
socio-economic background, whereas the common characteristic of the participants in 
the street-level is their socio-economic marginalisation. 
The street-level market is largely ignored by law enforcement. However, this 
is not the case with the transportation (and warehousing) of contraband cigarettes. 
According to data obtained from the Hellenic Coast Guard (2005), the majority of 
cigarette smugglers arrested by the Coast Guard from 2000 to 2004 are foreign 
nationals (70.7%, see table 3).  
 
Table 3. Greeks and foreign nationals arrested by the Hellenic Coast Guard for 
cigarette smuggling, 2000-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hellenic Coast Guard (2005) 
 
It should be noted however, that these figures do not present the actual representation 
of foreigners in the cigarette black market in Greece, but simply the over-
representation of foreigners in the transportation of the merchandise, a part of the 
business that is vulnerable to apprehension. 
 The legal sector is heavily involved in the cigarette black market. Similarly to 
other contexts (see, for example, Beare, 2003 and von Lampe, 2005) tobacco 
manufacturers in Greece in essence support or „turn a blind eye‟ to cigarette 
smuggling for their own reasons. Legitimate businesses such as warehouses, logistics 
companies and importation/exportations companies are (knowingly or unknowingly) 
involved along with retails shops that sell contraband cigarettes. The contraband 
cigarettes are distributed in the open and a closed market. The open market exists in 
public space in Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus and the closed markets in many 
cities, towns and resorts throughout the country. 
Violence is an extremely rare feature of the cigarette black market in Greece, 
and this is one of the reasons the market is largely tolerated by the public and the 
 Greeks Foreign nationals 
2000 54 101 
2001 7 17 
2002 4 37 
2003 7 28 
2004 12 20 
2000-2004 84 203 
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police. Violence jeopardises the market by attracting unnecessary attention on the part 
of law enforcement agencies, and is therefore “bad for business” (Pearson and Hobbs, 
2001: 42). 
 
 
Case Study 3 – Stolen Car and Car Parts Market 
The number of cars that are trafficked is basically the number of cars that are 
not recovered. However, the available evidence from the Greek Ministry of Public 
Order (MPO) relates to cleared car thefts, which does not automatically mean that the 
cars are recovered. Nevertheless, according to the police interviewed, the number of 
cleared thefts and the recovered cars are about the same. Due to the small differences, 
the available official statistics on cleared thefts can offer a valid representation of the 
volume of cars stolen in Greece and traded illegally.  
From 1998 to 2006, 56,390 cars were stolen. The majority of these thefts were 
committed in urban centres and particularly the Greater Athens area. 27,542 car thefts 
were not cleared (48.8%). Having the aforementioned data-related issue in mind, we 
can consider that about 27,542 cars were not recovered and were thus illegally traded. 
It should be noted however, that the number of non-recovered vehicles as an 
indication of the volume of illegally traded vehicles in Greece possesses more 
limitations: 
 Statistics on car thefts in Greece include cars that were stolen within Greece 
whereas car trafficking involves cars being stolen in Greece and other 
countries or stolen in other countries and traded in Greece.  
 A number of cars are stolen in Greece however, there are being traded illegally 
in other contexts, as it will be shown.  
 There are some cases in which a stolen car is recovered with some parts 
missing. These parts have been illegally traded but the vehicle is recovered 
and there is no official recording of the parts‟ theft.  
 Non-recovered cars may be stolen for joyriding or the facilitation of another 
criminal activity and be hidden, destroyed or thrown into the sea. Although, as 
the police argued, this is rare, their non-recovery does not mean they have 
been traded.  
There are generally three phases in the car trafficking business. The first phase 
involves stealing a car. The second phase involves „recycling‟ a car by altering the 
stolen car‟s VIN (Vehicle Identification Number), the 17-digit number, which is 
unique for every car, with the VIN of a crashed vehicle of same type and model. The 
„recycling‟ of a stolen car can also be achieved by the production of fraudulent car 
documents. The final phase involves selling the stolen and „recycled‟ car. Moreover, it 
would be appropriate to add another phase, transportation of stolen cars, for those 
cases in which cars are imported/exported into/out of Greece. The theft of a car is 
performed primarily by professional thieves. The „recycling‟ of the stolen cars is 
usually performed in garages in various Greek cities and towns many times by 
individuals who work legally in the field of car repairs.  
 Greece is a source, transit and destination country for traded stolen cars. Cars 
stolen from Greece are driven to Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria, and Turkey or 
transported in containers to countries of the Middle-East. Cars are also stolen from 
countries of Western Europe such as Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Spain and sold to Greece or in (other) Balkan and Eastern European 
countries and Turkey, Middle-East and Asia via Greece. Cars or cars parts are sold in 
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legal used car and/or car part dealerships cheaper than their original prices or their 
real price in the market.  
 From 1998 to 2006, out of the 3,429 offenders known to the police, 1,187 
(34.6%) were foreign nationals (MPO, 2007; graph 1).  
 
Graph 1. Number of total offenders and number of foreign offenders for car theft in 
Greece, 1998-2006  
 
 
 
Source: Data obtained from MPO (2007) 
 
This suggests that there is an over-representation of foreigners in the known offenders 
in Greece given that, according to the latest census, registered foreigners constitute 
7.3% of the total population of the country (ESYE, 2001). These figures however, 
suffer from a major drawback, namely they refer to known offenders for car thefts. In 
consequence, we cannot be certain about whether the foreign nationals are responsible 
for stolen cars that are non-recovered, and are, therefore, introduced in the market of 
stolen cars. The pre-trial reports obtained by the Greek police suggest that when 
foreign nationals steal a car, they abandon it shortly after the theft having stolen 
several articles or after having escaped. In addition, according to evidence from the 
pre-trial reports, in all cases in which foreign nationals were arrested for car theft, the 
cars were found and returned to their legal owners immediately, which suggests that 
the VIN was not altered. According to the Greek legislation when the VIN of a car is 
altered, the car is forwarded not to its legal owner but to the Public Property 
Management Organisation (ODDY in Greek) for auction. Other evidence such as this 
provided by interviews with car thieves, however, suggests the participation of 
foreign nationals in the theft, recycling and transportation phases of the business. For 
example, Russians and Italians are involved in the theft of a car, whereas Hungarians, 
Armenians and Georgians - among other – are involved in the transportation of stolen 
cars. We have not come across any evidence of the involvement of foreigners in the 
sale of stolen cars and car parts in Greece.     
 Corruption in the car trafficking business in Greece is not a major theme 
because instrumental parts of the illegal trade in stolen cars such as the change of 
VIN, do not need the contribution of public officials to materialise. In addition, the 
fact that the „recycling‟ and the sale of stolen cars (and car parts) usually take place 
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within legal businesses explains further why public officials do not come into frequent 
adversarial contact with people involved in the trade. Finally, violence is not an 
integral part of the car trafficking business. There is no monopoly in the illegal trade 
in stolen cars, and stolen cars or stolen car parts are distributed through numerous 
legal outlets. There is, therefore, no particular need to control large parts of (stolen) 
merchandise or segments of the market.   
  
 
Discussion 
 It is evident that the official and „unofficial‟ discourse on „organised crime‟ in 
Greece has fallen into what Albanese (2004) calls “the ethnicity trap”. The perception 
that there is an „alien conspiracy‟ against Greece embodied in „organised crime‟ and 
the establishment of detrimental illegal markets based on specific groups of foreigners 
is consolidated in the country. This perception must be seen within the general context 
of immigration as well as the immigration-and-crime nexus. Several variables have 
been instrumental with the legal framework in Greece (and the rest of „Fortress 
Europe‟) being extremely important. This legal framework greatly influenced “the 
opportunity structures of undocumented migrants” (Engbersen and van der Leun, 
1998: 217), and led to the marginalisation and exclusion of immigrants that were 
„allowed‟ to remain in the country. By allowing for very few legal channels for 
migration into the country, this legal framework also led to a large number of 
migrants resorting to the services of smugglers. The media have played an important 
role in this criminalisation process. A „moral panic‟ about (the „organised criminality‟ 
of) migrants has been prevalent in Greece, and the „organized criminal Other‟ has 
been an image prevalent in the media representations on the national and local level 
(see, for example, Karydis, 1996; Konstantinidou, 1999). Unfavourable stereotypical 
public views about foreigners can also be observed in Greece (see Antonopoulos, 
2006a) some of which are based on deep historical and social variables, and which 
have further distanced Greeks and immigrants socially, and reinforced the 
exclusionary attitudes and practices towards migrants. 
There are however, issues for discussion in relation to the participation of 
foreigners in „organised crime‟ and illegal markets in particular. As was shown 
earlier, there has been a wider official, media and public perception in Greece that 
illegal markets are the context of operation of rigid, hierarchical, Mafia-type 
organisations. Unlike some other countries this is a mainstream approach to 
‘organised crime’, perhaps due to the Greek discourse and policy not placing a focus 
on the issue of „organise crime‟ until recently, as well as the inadequate empirical 
research on the topic. However, as it was shown by the presentation of the social 
organisation of three illegal markets, this is largely a mistaken perception. No 
evidence for mafia-type structures could be found. The important entity in all three 
markets is this of the network (see, for example, Reuter, 1983).  The dynamics of the 
markets and the context within which these markets take place do not allow for the 
establishment of rigid, pyramidal structures. There is no „organisation‟ or „authority‟, 
which enforces or directs policy and practice to supposedly „members‟ of such an 
„organisation‟. Instead what does exist in the described illegal markets are networks 
of action-oriented individuals, who in most instances act for their personal interests 
and often on improvisation. Networks are the best vehicle for these illegal businesses 
since “…the most reliable flow of supply comes from myriad of small scale, 
uncoordinated firms. Having diverse source for the illicit commodities means that if 
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the regulators knock off one or a few, the market continues uninterrupted” (Beare and 
Naylor, 1999: 17).  
Similarly, there is no „transnational‟ authority coordinating each of the illegal 
markets presented in the current article something that detracts from the 
representation of „organised crime‟ as an imported feature that is offered by the 
MPO‟s annual reports on „organised crime‟. According to van Duyne (2003a: 43), 
given that “…since time immemorial the traffic of most… commodities implies the 
crossing of border, it is difficult to understand the added value of the adjective 
„transnational‟”. We can pose the same reservation if one considers, for instance, that 
evidence of tobacco smuggling involving Greeks has been present long before the 
presence of migrant/foreign nationals‟ communities in the country. Gardikas (1958) 
argues that in the 1950s the Greek police had a modus operandi file for smugglers, 
which included tobacco and cigarette paper smugglers. This was long before the 
transformation of Greece into an immigration country, and the tobacco black market 
was certainly not a business controlled by the „Other‟.  
 The ethnic make-up of the networks involved in the illegal markets presented 
in this article is also a very interesting issue and instrumental for the argument posed. 
These networks are ethnically heterogeneous as they involve individuals of various 
nationalities, and by no means confine themselves to specific ethnic groups or 
„exclude‟ specific ethnic groups (although one may observe the absence of specific 
nationalities from specific parts of an illegal market). Such a practice would provide 
for an impediment for the business since a number of individuals having the capital, 
social relations, and the access to merchandise as well as the abilities to be involved 
in the business would be displaced at the expense of the (illegal) market. Foreigners 
are involved in the three illegal markets presented here (and indeed other illegal 
markets in the country) and many of those serve as important nodes in the networks; 
however, by no means foreigners control the three markets presented. At best they 
may have some control over individuals who belong to the same ethnic group 
forming clusters that are important to the business; or they may control specific parts 
of the market. Because of stereotypes, discrimination and other reasons, it is 
extremely difficult for foreigners, particularly non-EU nationals, to be involved in 
important parts of the illegal businesses. For example, foreigners cannot be involved 
in the selling of stolen cars through a used car dealership primarily because migrants 
do not own (at least as yet) used car dealerships. Moreover, it is very likely that even 
if they owned such a business this would have been either scrutinised by the law 
enforcement or looked unfavourably by the Greek buyers. In addition, no foreigners 
have ever been accused of corruption in Greece simply because no foreigner can be a 
public official.  
Greek nationals are heavily involved in different phases and different levels of 
the illegal markets presented. For instance, Greek tobacco manufacturers in essence 
support the black market in cigarettes for their own objectives, which are –to an 
extent – similar to these of the illegal entrepreneurs involved in the cigarette black 
market. In addition, Greek used car dealers many times knowingly sell stolen cars, 
and Greek hotel/house/apartment owners provide lodging for undocumented migrants 
in the smuggling process.  
The heavy involvement of Greeks in illegal markets not only signifies that 
these illegal markets are not exclusively the business of the „Other‟ but also offers a 
very clear indication of the ways in which the legal and the illegal are increasingly 
blurred. There is a wider perception that there is a clear boundary between the legal 
and the illegal market, the upperworld and the underworld (van Duyne, 2003b). This 
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is not surprising since, as Edwards and Gill (2002: 208) suggest, “this perception of 
illicit entrepreneurs operating beyond and outside of the legitimate economy can be 
understood as a logical consequence of the perception of criminal organisations as 
external interlopers”. In other words the distinction between the upperworld and the 
underworld is well placed in the conceptualisation of „organised crime‟ as a negative, 
imported feature associated with the „Other‟. However, illegal marketers are there not 
to subverse the legal system but only to exploit opportunities for profit and in the 
same way illegal marketers are benefited by the legal sector, legal businesses are also 
benefited by „organised crime‟ in various ways. The illegal markets presented in the 
current article are not always antagonistic or injurious (Passas, 2002) to their 
legitimate counterparts or the legal sector as a whole. Criminality in not completely 
unknown to legitimate businesses and neither do criminals live off legitimate business 
in a parasitic way.  
 It is questionable whether „organised crime‟ engages in a campaign to corrupt 
public officials, as proposed by „Alien Conspiracy Theory‟. Firstly, Greek public 
officials are not essentially ethical. Over the years, for example, there have been 
many cases of police corruption publicized in the Greek media that revealed the 
accepting of bribes, erasing fines for traffic offences given to friends and relatives, as 
well as getting actively involved in „organized criminal activities‟ such as drug 
trafficking, extortion, trafficking and smuggling of migrants into Greece, and the sex 
industry. The examples of police corruption, which mostly have the veil of financial 
gain, are precipitated by the low pay of police officer and indeed other law 
enforcement agents. Secondly, as was mentioned earlier, corruption of public officials 
is not essential for illegal business. It only becomes essential when there is an 
adversarial confrontation between illegal marketers and law enforcement agents (Levi 
and Naylor, 2000).  
 Finally, a variable that influences the presence of some (illegal) markets in 
Greece is not produced by „outsiders‟ but by forces that are exclusively Greek. These 
are, for instance, the forces of demand for a specific commodity in a market culture 
(see Taylor and Jamieson, 1999). Potter has suggested that “organised crime is an 
ongoing and continually developing social process” (Potter, 1994: 40), and indeed 
forms of „organised crime‟ and/or illegal markets have to be seen as an integral part 
of the general social, historical, legal and economic contexts in the country. For 
instance, the smuggling of migrants is a business facilitated by the strict legal 
framework of immigration in Greece (and the rest of the western world) that does not 
leave many options to migrants but to seek for the services of smugglers. 
Additionally, the very nature of economic activity in Greece, involving small-scale 
family businesses, agriculture, the traditional existence of the (large) informal 
economy as well as the reluctance of young Greek people to be employed in 
unglamorous and underpaid jobs, create a fertile ground for the demand of cheap 
labour (Psimmenos, 2001) supported by the smuggling of migrants. Similarly, 
cigarettes constitute a commodity for which there is a very large, receptive market, 
which involves “voluntary transfers” and “an implicit notion of fair market value” 
(Naylor, 2003: 85), and is, therefore, received well by large parts of the population. It 
is also useful to note that the illegal marketers attempt at exploiting opportunities and 
gaining profit by counterbalancing the interventions and restrictions imposed to a 
market by the state and authorities themselves, who act as the ultimate “market 
determiners” (van Duyne, 2007: 46). 
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Conclusion 
As the presentation of the three case studies shows, the three particular illegal markets 
in Greece are not „controlled‟ or „owned‟ by foreigners, and ethnicity as a social 
variable in these markets is over-estimated. The current article does not of course 
suggest that foreigners are not involved in „organised criminal activities‟ in Greece 
neither completely precludes the possibility that ethnically homogeneous, hierarchical 
structures may be present in, „control‟ or  own‟ other illegal markets. In addition, it is 
not my intention in this paper to discuss the „alien conspiracy‟ in those sectors 
considered as „organised crime‟ that do not possess entrepreneurial characteristics. 
Additional research is needed and recommended not only in the three particular 
markets presented in this article but also on other markets such as, for instance, the 
drugs and arms markets in Greece as well as „organised criminal activities‟ that do not 
display entrepreneurial characteristics such as extortion and violence. Within such a 
research nexus, the role of foreigners and the patterns of cooperation among groups of 
foreigners, and between foreigners and Greeks in these markets and activities must 
emerge as one of the primary objectives. Understanding the conditions under which 
illegal market associational and organizational structures, which are more complex 
than the two extremes (Mafia – Networks), emerge is also an interesting and 
important issue to be researched.
6
 The „conspiring criminal alien‟ is an image well 
integrated in the Greek social consciousness, and one that has led to the further 
criminalisation and victimisation of foreigners in the country (see, for example, 
Antonopoulos, 2006b) particularly the non-EU nationals or nationals from „non-
respectable countries‟. We can only agree with Paoli and Reuter (2008: 14) in that 
“the relationship between ethnic minorities and crime…is too important to be left 
solely to moral entrepreneurs”. 
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